Key Insights:
-These operations allow junior leaders greater latitude and usually end up empowering them in the exercise of initiative and imagination, a fact not always welcomed by the establishment after operations cease.
* Despite general European public "shyness" toward casualties, soldiers appear to be seeking service in these operations as adventure or escape from otherwise routine duties at home.
-The media world has changed, and truth must be sought from multiple sources as CNN seldom has much to offer.
Discussion.
On June [16] [17] [18] 2005 , the Strategic Studies Institute co-hosted a conference on "The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces" in cooperation with the Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Defense, Royal United Services Institute, the Association of the United States Army, the Fbrderkreis Deutsches Heer, the Heritage Foundation, and the United States Embassy, Paris. The audience, by design and invitation, was small, not exceeding 30 people, to permit extended discussions.
Peace operations and their associated stability undertakings have a very long history, but relatively little attention has been paid to the impact these have had on military organizations. Obviously the more such operations a military force is engaged in, the greater effectiveness one would expect, but that effect seems to run from institutional ad hocery to formalization in doctrine and established policies. Further, as the conditions under examination generally follow conflict operations of one sort or another, a period of transition always occurs. In some national security establishments, mechanisms exist to make the transition relatively easy; in others they do not, hot topic "The Clash of Cultures," in this case, and the transition becomes more difficult.
particularly from a sociological perspective. The conference focused on two objectives: Dr. Leonard Wong, Strategic Studies Institute, First, to stimulate research along interdisciplinary addressed the impactofcurrent stability operations lines concerning the impact of developing trends on U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq from which he in peacekeeping and stability operations over the just recently returned. His presentation dealt long term; and, second, to illuminate the work with issues of recruiting, retention, the military of policymakers in the near term as they wrestle family, the psychological impact of repeated with issues associated with "boots on the ground" tours in a combat theater, and associated issues of transitioning to low-quarters or even flip-flops.
uncertainty and danger in the midst of a strange Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, culture. This contrasted in some measure with Royal United Services Institute, presented the a yet-to-be-released German Army survey, two opening remarks, noting that not-war operations essentials of which suggested a strong public bias vary widely. He cited casualty figures versus against German military involvement in casualtydays of operations in recent undertakings that producing situations, while on the other hand, proved that Stability Operations often are deadly.
exhibiting a strong bias toward German military He noted the centrality of continued civil and involvement in "doing good." Dr. Christopher governmental support to the deployed forces, but
Coker, London School of Economics, addressed questioned the longer-term impact of repetitive the psychological effects (PTSD, etc.) of casualties use of Reservists and their relations with their in a "not-war" condition and the effects on regular employers. In a Stability Operations recruiting. He focused his remarks on the belated environment, "lessons" need to be "learned" and recognition that what was first seen as cowardice implanted in the deployed force rapidly; "an agile in World War I, later came to be described as shellenemy requires an agile response." Because of the shock and neurasthenia -weakened heart. Today prevalence of rapid change, training can never be we are familiar with PTSD, but we also see armies up-to-date, and everything ultimately will have keeping track of this casualty category and taking to rest on values.
positive actions to ameliorate its effects, such as The first panel focused on the "Historical mandatory transition counseling. Even the SAS Context of Western Military Interventions" with has a counseling center now, partly in response former USAWC Visiting Professor Brian Linn, to a lawsuit in the UK in which a soldier sued and Texas A&M University, reviewing the first major won on the basis that he had been traumatized by American overseas episode -administering the action in Bosnia. Coker argued that the concept Philippines following the Spanish-American of sacrifice is gradually mutating into issues War of 1898. He identified major similarities in of "dignity," which is all about self. This, he general form between that past and the current indicated, was just another step down the road of situations, including the unpreparedness of the excusing people from any sense of responsibility U.S. Army to conduct these less-than-normal by arguing there is a medical "cause" for what combat operations. In both cases, junior officers should better be viewed as normal activity in became responsible for civil matters well outside stressful conditions. their range of normal training or even authority,
The third panel was "Operations on 'Complex andin both cases, junior leaders were the ones who Terrain': The Law and the Media." Among figured out how to deal with the most pressing the major changes in the legal landscape is the issues. Atrocities were experienced early in both prevalence of "terrorists," who technically operate operations, and in both cases, the media was the outside the law but are currently the major active precipitating vehicle of exposure, but likewise in adversaries. Mr. Laurent Boussi6, Correspondent both cases, internal remediation was quick and for France 2 in the United Kingdom, reflected effective.
on his experiences in Somalia as a reporter. He The second panel addressed that most timely noted that during that entire operation, Somalia was exporting meat and fruit to South Africa. He
Johnson, Strategic Studies Institute, reviewed observed further that 80km south of Mogadishu, the history of U.S. Army experiences beginning in the supposed heart of the famine area, he with General Winfield Scott's occupation and found fully productive banana plantations. In subsequent administration of Mexico City short, he noted that media typically focus on following the 1846 Mexican War, and particularly "sympathy" and "emotional" issues without emphasized the U.S. Army's experience during much regard for the whole truth -news through Reconstruction, which resulted in the exclusion a soda straw. Many reporters are shy about asking of serving military from the Posse Comitatus Act. hard questions and will not do so without strong This was one of the most influential effects of editorial encouragement. Dr. James Carafano, an historical Stability Operation upon the U.S. Heritage Foundation, took up the issue of the Army, and it continues in evidence with the conduct of operations in the glare of what is military's reluctance to become engaged in police now a multinational, global media operating activities of any kind despite increasing evidence under widely varying editorial guidelines. He that it must. He described the present condition challenged several characterizations of media surrounding the issue of Stability Operations as influence including the time-worn canard that revolving around the evolution of Department the media directly influence operations, citing of Defense Directive 3000: Department of Defense William Hammond's work as principal evidence.
Capabilities for Stability Operations which, inits early Leadership credibility was the single most iterations, posited conditions that would have the important factor in how the general population U.S. Army deployed to the present in Nicaragua, responds to news. He argued that anyone can Haiti, Somalia, Grenada, Lebanon, and dozens get whatever media coverage they want, but of other places around the world. He concluded that freedom of the press does not mean truth in by noting the inclusion of Stability Operations as presentation. Several participants had suggested a new feature in Joint Doctrine, thus cementing that al Jezerrah was more accurate in its reporting experience into formal practice. than CNN, an issue left largely unaddressed by Major General Carlo Gabigiosu, Italian Army, others. Some discussion was generated by the recounted his services with multinational forces comment that truth might be better portrayed if in Kosovo and Iraq. His principal point was that soldiers were to become reporters. (This would be NATO forces worked very well together because a reversion of our Civil War experience, but like they had become habituated over years of doing the case of embedded reporters during Operation so and had internalized standard operating IRAQI FREEDOM, all they would see was what procedures and practices. This was obviously not they saw -through a soda straw. Nevertheless, the case with other coalition members. Since there the truth of action on the ground might be better had been little in the way of major combat actions received and result in more sympathetic support with these groups, interoperability issues were for the troops.) much simplified -sharing transportation assets is "Boots on the Ground: Perspectives in Military nowhere as difficult as integrating major weapons and Political Science," the last panel, pursued platforms. He also noted the omnipresence of the some of the earlier surfaced historical roots, asking media and the shift in attitude and practice from how the several represented national militaries avoidance at almost any cost, to training -training had adapted to the experiences of engagement on two key principals -tell the truth, or remairn in peacekeeping and stability operations. Intrasilent. The Stability Operations environment is coalition difficulties are a natural consequence of not a uniform condition, he noted further, and the different evolutionary paths and, in one sense, may often require overwhelming force at first, returned the conferees to the legal issues noted generally moving toward conditions in which in the previous panel. In the American case, the small teams suffice, but high performing staffs period of Reconstruction, 1865-77, has a direct and are always crucial. continuing constraining influence. Dr. Douglas
The conference surfaced numerous issues not noted here, but all demanding continuing investigation and collaboration.
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